JACK CHURCHILL

TAPE 3, Side 1

March 27, 1996

M.O'R.: This is a continuation of the interview with Jack Churchill on March 27th.

J.C.: The other thing we did was - I did which was great fun was establish a lot of relationships with the National Association of Counties and the National Association of Soil Conservation Districts, and Chuck was from the environmental community and very active. So for the first time he built citizens' support at the national level for the programs of the BLM, and I was kind of responsible for doing a lot of the dog work on, you know, keeping all of that going and building it, particularly with the National Association of Counties.

And we established a model planning program in each of the western states with one county on how to jointly plan public and private lands, and we kind of set them up, and I was involved in that program. So I traveled a great deal, about two weeks a month, and being a bachelor at that time, it was kind of fun. You know, I'd take my ski boots or shotgun and go pheasant shooting, or a fishing rod, or whatever the season was.

So you know, we set up in - oh god, I forgot the name of the - the county next to the Tetons in Wyoming, and there's three million acres and 3,000 people. And we set up - we got them through a county land use plan that would fit with, you know, a large mass of public land area. And I found them a rancher who was also a city planner of some sort.

And so we had one out in Eastern Montana where we had the scattered land issue, and how the counties relate to, you know, scattered 40's and so on. And you know, in Colorado I forget what it had to do with, you know. Whatever it was. So in each of the states we had a kind of a -. And we put together kind of a - so that we then were moving a large part of what they call the lands part of the Bureau towards planning itself. I had set up training sessions for all the lands people and - well, also district managers. I did those, and we set up these national conferences trying to change the direction of the Bureau. So I did a lot of internal work like that. It was kind of fun.

M.O'R.: Now, this - I'm just trying to think ...

J.C.: That's where we learned about being an agent of change, with some opportunities. I always was, I suppose, but anyhow, this one was very successful. Where the bosses were really willing in the bureaucracy, although struggling, was motivated. They wanted to do their job. They knew they had to change, and they were willing to change, and they were secure enough in their selves, their - you know, in their -.

The Bureau of Land Management is a fairly decentral - like the Forest Service should have been. The people on the ground could think for themselves, they just had to. And even though they bent to the political winds at times, they were out there, and they're getting shot at all the time, and they just were very independent people. But they also had a strong land ethic, even though it was out of the grazing service, you know, they were [indiscernible].

M.O'R.: So the change that you're referring to, is that ...

J.C.: Well, it's just a change in - like we spent a whole week retooling - I guess it was the whole Bureau? Anyhow, I hired Hal Weissen and a couple of guys, the head of the American Institute of Planners, and we put on a week's training session on land use planning. And the other guy was an assistant to the director of the old HUD program. It wasn't quite a department then. And he came - helped - you know, and he'd come out, because he'd been a planner in Alaska, you know, a land use - you know, a town planner. And so how do you - you know, how do you get people that are looking at broad landscapes thinking about urban planning and, you know, that doesn't quite fit, you'd think. But anyhow, with the concept we really had a tremendous - it had a tremendous impact. And we brought in visual - we started visual planning, then, in the Bureau, you know. Aesthetics. The landscape, what does the landscape look like? You know, when you build a road, how does it affect - you know, this type of thing.

And there was a lot of work that was going on at the University of Wisconsin at the time. And Stoddard had come out of the land use planning movement of Wisconsin, and that's why he was so - and he had a farm in Wisconsin, and he pulled me and - I told him I knew all about land use planning, and I'd worked with John D. Black at Harvard and thank you very much, but I don't need much - I know everything.

And he said, "No, you don't." He said, "You're going to come up to Wisconsin, and with Paul Carlin of the National Association of Counties, and we're going to go down and talk to Walter Rollins at the University of Wisconsin and learn about, you know, land use planning, and township planning," which started in Wisconsin.

So we had a big weekend educational experience ...

M.O'R.: How was it?

J.C.: ... at the University of Wisconsin with Walter Rollins. And so, anyhow, this was kind of an episode in land use planning, and the Forest Service was looking at this, and [indiscernible] was on good terms with the Forest Service, so I got to, you know, work very closely with some of the people at the Forest Service and establish a lot of relationships that later came into play when I worked for the EPA.

M.O'R.: And what about Oregon at that time? I assume that was one of the places you visited when you were setting this up?

J.C.: Yeah. I'm trying to think of what we - I don't even remember. The only thing about Oregon at that time was that Stoddard quickly got into enormous battles with the timber industry over the [indiscernible], and his state director here was very close to the McCrackens and the middle - what I call the middle lumber companies - and I even forget some of those names. Oh, but Dan Gold, interestingly enough, was in one of those companies, and he walked off with a fifth of one of his companies, and he was regional director of BLM and drove one of the company cars for years. Morse would never let him in to the Department of Interior or Agriculture during the Kennedy Administration.

M.O'R.: Because of that?

J.C.: Because of that, yeah. Because he was - under Marion Claussen, you know, he had been regional administrator of the BLM, and he really opened the doors to the lumber people. So anyway, it's interesting that he and - you know, and Goldy was a great instigator of, you know, clear cutting, you know.

M.O'R.: And of course by this time Hatfield was governor, too, and he was fairly friendly with ...

J.C.: Yeah. I knew Mark when he was governor, and I was sick about that when I was editor of the *Oregon Democrat*. We used to meet at various meetings and be very, very friendly. He said, "I guess we can shake hands under the table. I can share a little bit here."

Actually, he was a different Hatfield then. And the only thing I remember him trying to do was - I helped stop - because Beulah Hand got excited - was he wanted to give all the offshore oil of Oregon to Shell Oil Company, and he almost had a deal cooked up before anybody knew it. [laughs]

M.O'R.: But you stopped it?

J.C.: Well, I don't know whether I stopped it. I mean, I think the Attorney General at that time got excited and - you know. But yeah, I went up and down the Coast.

Matter of fact, I was sitting over at the Coast - I went up and down the Oregon - and got the Oregon Coast Association - I thought I was going to get them excited about it, but the oil and gas industry flew in and beat me out at the last moment over the cocktail hour. But I raised enough hell, and I remember Herb Lundy at the time was - of *The Oregonian* was sitting there, and -. But that was another episode.

Back in the BLM, the big thing - and this Stoddard - this was - became a feud between the state director, Geddy, and Stoddard, the director of BLM. And it was over the allowable cut, how much could be cut, and ...

M.O'R.: This is in Oregon?

J.C.: Yeah. Between the state director of Oregon of the BLM and the national director. So there was to be this great meeting of two boards, both the ONC board and the State BLM board. They were different ones, because one was for grazing, and one was west side and one was east side. And Stoddard was to explain his policies. I forget what it was.

And so I came out as a kind of an advance team before it started to see if we could line up any friends. And I went to the head of the International Woodworkers, who was on the board, and I thought sure - god, I mean, I knew him. A guy who had worked with me on the *Oregon Democrat* was - worked for him, and I thought -.

He said, "This thing is so cookbook ..." McKinley was on the boards, you know, and Charlie Sprague, who was, you know, former governor and editor of the *Oregon Statesman*. It was quite a prestigious board.

M.O'R.: McKinley, your old college professor?

J.C.: Yeah. You know, it was quite a -. The Undersecretary, John Carver, who was from Idaho, was supposed to come out and kind of lead the meeting and protect Stoddard, you know. This was all cooked up in Udall's office. And - oh, and another - oh, and one of the - I guess the key issue here was Point Reyes National Park. I'd forgotten about that. Stoddard had worked with this guy to start putting together Point Reyes National Park, and the president of the Western Bank, Bill Sweet, had bought land at this - he was a great friend of the Secretary's and a great friend of Stoddard's, and he was a conservationist. And you know, without any, you know, way above - very high personal status or you know, whatever he was, environmentalist, ecologist. I mean, you know, academic, you know,

with credentials all over the world. But he was interested in putting together Point Reyes Park. Well, he got Bill Sweet to buy some land down there, with the idea of exchanging it. And so they wrote an exchange - you know, they wrote a park - you know, acquisition thing with the possibility of exchange in neighboring states.

And so Sweet said, "Okay, well, I'll swap you some land in Southern Oregon, some of these 40's." Our policy was - the scattered 40's - was to try and consolidate public lands - and so it was very legitimate. You know, okay, "Well, we'll give you a few 40's, and we'll take off this piece, a very significant piece, in Point Reyes National Park to be established in California."

But the thing was that this was Oregon land going for California, and good old Governor Hatfield said, "Ah-ha! You're picking up land by helicopter and taking it to California." And that really became the image, see. It was called the Sweet Swap.

And Chuck Stoddard - and of course the local timber people with the state director said, "Look what we've got here. The national director is trying to take our land." And so you know, everything became very provincial, very isolated, it's here against Washington thing, and you know, it was just. Morse was trying to, you know - I guess Morse kind of engineered this thing, too, because you've got, you know, the Congressional delegation got quickly involved in it and so on. So I don't know, you know.

So we were going to have this meeting, and John Carver, the Undersecretary, was supposed to protect Stoddard, except that he gave me a note. He said, "Now, I want you to call me at 10:30. Bring this note to me."

And I brought him this note, and there was nothing on it. And he said, "Oh, I've got a very important call. I have to go over to call the Secretary." And he never came back. And he left Stoddard there hanging out to dry.

So this wonderful guy from Eastern Oregon said that - who was over at La Grande said that, "This is the first time we've ever had the Administrator for lunch," and they really - you know, he had to take the heat for the Secretary and everything else in terms of this so-called Sweet Swap.

But behind this was the allowable cut issue, because then they even had - you see all the riparian areas in the allowable cut. They had every scrap of land into the allowable cut, and everything, you know - I mean, there I was nothing set aside for anything except timber in the [indiscernible] way, and the only purpose was to, you know, take down the trees. And so Stoddard was trying to build in at least something that resembled something the Forest Service was doing because they were doing a lot better job over the timber at that time.

The price we pay is what we see in the middle fork of the - well, some of the Umpqua, lower Umpqua, and the - oh, what's the river south of the Umpqua? The middle fork there is really, really widely clear-cut lands.

But anyhow, the next day I took - Stoddard and I got on a train and went over to Eastern Oregon. I remember waking up going into La Grande, I think, and we were looking at the aspen and -. He got quickly revived. We went to an Isaac Walton state convention, and of course I wrote this story for *The Oregonian*, "Standing

Ovation for Stoddard in La Grande." [laughs] Anyhow, that was my - kind of a political experience.

M.O'R.: But it wasn't really a standing ovation?

J.C.: Well, I think it was. I forget, you know. But anyhow, I remember I wrote the story. He whipped them up.

M.O'R.: And now, let me just make sure I understand you. You were saying that basically you were going to take a bunch of sort of isolated pockets of land in southern Oregon that were destined to be clear-cut anyway, or probably would have wound up ...

J.C.: Oh, the Sweet Swap?

M.O'R.: Yeah.

J.C.: Well, they were going to be cut anyhow. I mean, they were part of the Oregon - the ONC timber base. They were part of the Coos Bay [indiscernible]. But all of these national parks have exchange provisions when they're set up, and usually they have it on border states, so you can exchange public lands to block in for a high value national park land. I mean, this is not - I mean, this has been done on every national park, you know. Either that or they use the public lands as capital to acquire, for acquisition purposes, through exchange. And it's very difficult, but it goes on all the - you know, it's been going on all the time.

So what we had done in the classification multiple act, was say, "Look, I mean, we've got these scattered 40's out here. We should exchange these and get - in some of the inholdings out of here, and we'd be the, you know, dominant manager and get these out of the private, because it's already surrounded by private land."

Now, that worked, except where people wanted to get onto private lands through a little island, like in Montana, where they

could go out there and start hunting, they had to get access to it. So people didn't want - wanted to keep the 40's, you know, I mean as public, because they were good islands. But they're very difficult - from a management objective, the land manager would rather, say, block up and - you know, and manage a piece of land, because they're very - they weren't really managed if they were scattered. I mean, for instance, on timber, they were very subject to trespass; people would go in and cut. I mean, you know, you could not really protect them, a scattered 40 out in the middle of a private timber patch. I mean, there were no survey lines. I mean, what the hell?

And so over time - and look at - I mean, you know, the thefts being reported by Weyerhaeuser and everybody else in this country, I mean, probably half of those have been gone anyhow. So we had classified those. These were classified for exchange, disposal, and it just so happened it got into a political thing and so on. But there was nothing - I mean, it was an open program of what we were doing.

M.O'R.: Right. And so these isolated - when you say 40's, are they - what? - 40 ...

J.C.: Well, 40 acres. A quarter section, you know.

M.O'R.: Okay. So the idea was you'd go ahead and privatize these 40-acre sections in Oregon, and then wind up with more public land at Point Reyes in California?

J.C.: That's exactly - yeah. That was - yeah.

M.O'R.: Right. I see. And I'm a little fuzzy; now, what actually happened?

J.C.: Oh, it was killed. It never happened. I think Reyes - I think - maybe eventually it went through. I don't know. Maybe Sweet finally got it. I don't know. But you know, Bill Sweet was a fairly public guy. He was president of the Western Bank. He wasn't such a bad sort, you know? I mean, he really was doing this more for public interest than timber. I mean, he was always into the timber business, but you know, he did it because this guy had really asked him to do it.

M.O'R.: But obviously that kind of issue ...

J.C.: I mean, this was my understanding of what it was. Oh, it was a very inflammable issue.

M.O'R.: Right. In terms of the headlines it made?

J.C.: Oh, yeah. And Hatfield had the land being picked up - and he really beat the drums. Even Bob Straub, I think who was state - god, you know, I remember - I think even - it was either Tom McCall came to this meeting. Hatfield came to the meeting, Tom McCall and Bob Straub, and you know, he was the state treasurer then, and McCall was Secretary of State, isn't that right, and - yeah. Oh god, yeah. And the whole -. It was kind of an exciting episode, come to think of it. A lot of anxiety on my trip out there. I knew the ax was falling, but never did we know how big the ax was.

But that was really the downfall of Stoddard at that - you know, once you create so much trouble in a bureaucracy, you know, it's pretty hard to recover.

M.O'R.: And so that sort of marked his decline, then?

J.C.: Yeah. Both he and - and you know, and so everybody said, "Well, the real solution is to get rid of both of them," both

Geddy and Stoddard. You know, and that usually happens. So that's why you don't rock the boat too often.

M.O'R.: So this would have been, what, in the early 60's?

J.C.: '63. Well, '64, '65, somewhere in there.

M.O'R.: So you were in Washington at the time of the Kennedy assassination, too, then?

J.C.: Actually, yeah. I was on a plane. I was out at this county and looking at some stuff in Eastern Colorado. Came back to Denver and that was, you know, when they announced the assassination. All through the funeral and all the stuff like that.

M.O'R.: Well, so you saw the transition, then, of power to Lyndon Johnson, too?

J.C.: Mm-hmm.

M.O'R.: It must have been the Johnson Administration then in '65 when you went to the Water Quality Administration?

J.C.: Right. Yeah. And while I was in the BLM I became very good friends with a guy by the name of Dan Ogden who worked on the resources program, and I got one or two committees, I forget what it was, to help organize the White House conference on national beauty, which is a great thing that Mrs. Johnson did. And she brought in Lawrence Rockefeller and all the environmental groups - or the conservation groups. There weren't any environmental groups then. And everybody sang and danced and ate and talked and did lots of good things. And Lyndon came in and wanted to be sure everybody was having a good time.

And I forget - but you know, it was a very important mark of White House recognition of the natural beauty issue at that time, so that was - what? '67? Well, now let's see. This was probably

before I left BLM. '65 I left BLM and went with the Water Quality Administration, which had been or quickly moved from HEW to - which was in the Health Department, I guess. Health - Secretary of Health? I don't know. Public Health Service. It was in the Public Health Service. Water quality and air quality both came out of the Public Health Service, the EPA, but Water Quality went to Interior for five years, and Stuart Udall stole it from Public Health Service and put it in Interior because he wanted it.

So the Water Quality Administration came to Interior, and I went over as their planning and legislative director.

M.O'R.: Was that a decision that you made?

J.C.: Oh, yeah.

M.O'R.: To make that move?

J.C.: Oh, yeah. Stoddard was either out or was on his way out, and you know, I mean, the play was over there, and the opportunity was in - you could see was in the water quality bill. Yeah, I was offered a good job.

M.O'R.: And what was the job, exactly?

J.C.: The head of policy and legislation. It was a small staff. Just review legislation, write legislation and -.

M.O'R.: And so this was under Udall, then?

J.C.: Yeah. Yeah, it was quickly under Udall if it - I think we might have been in transition. I forget whether - I'm not really sure it had already happened, but it was - quickly we were from Public Health Service, and the leaders were no longer commissioned officers in the Public Health Service. They were decommissioned and made civilians, the administrators at the time.

M.O'R.: And you said you knew Udall personally, a little bit?

J.C.: Yeah, slightly. Yeah.

M.O'R.: Well, he's certainly become kind of an interesting figure, especially with his - you know, even recently with his book a couple of years ago or whenever it was.

J.C.: Mm-hmm.

M.O'R.: And you were working - I think you said to me when I spoke with you earlier that you were working out regulations for the Water Quality Act?

J.C.: No. No, no. Not then. My job then was to review legislation and work in the two committees that related to water quality. I guess it was the Public Works Committee in the House, and Muskie's committee - the Air and Water Quality Committee in the Senate, and then it was in the Commerce Committee, too. So what I did was just - was the agency lobbyist for the Hill.

M.O'R.: I see.

J.C.: And so, you know, basically after - this was after the 1965 Act which established - the Water Quality Act, which established water quality standards. And Bob Burd, whose house we're using, was one of those players that was on Alan Hurst's staff who had hired me to work up the water quality standards. But I was not involved in working up those regulations and stuff. Burd was, and some other people. What I did was the standard - you know, our Congressional committees and committee staffs, really, and I worked with the committee staff mostly. Once in a while with the principals, Muskie and somebody. I worked on the 1960 oil legislation.

Interesting story about that. You know, the oil lobby is pretty important, and they're always very - somewhere had their rooms in the Department of Interior regardless of which administra-

tion. They had their hands on the control of power, and certainly in the Congress, and particularly - and I think Jim Wright was chairman of this committee from Texas. And you know, the oil had certainly dominated the committee. And we would be - I would have to be sitting outside the committee rooms when they were marking up the national oil legislation. Well, of course the oil lobbyists were inside.

And then Santa Barbara came, the big oil spill in Santa Barbara, and it was a pretty bad spill, and even Nixon went out and looked at it. And you know, kind of after the spill we were in writing legislation. You know, we had some very competent people on our staff, and I got them into it, and the oil lobby was sitting outside, and we marked up a good bill in the House. So it was interesting, how tides change.

And you know, interestingly enough, you know, now - you know, I would be working with Muskie's administrative assistant directly on legislation, and Muskie would come in and, you know, we'd chat about something or other. But how things have changed - oh, and when they did the 1972 act, there was just one guy on Muskie's staff that really - Leonard Billings, that really did this - he was Muskie's administrative assistant, and he only related to one or two people, and also maybe the minority counsel or whatever, you know. And now, you know, there are so many staff levels in the Congress and so many staff levels in the administration, so many more people involved. I mean, it's so changed now. I was there, I think, during the last of kind of a time of personal communication. You know, it was still small then. But now the bureaucra-

cies on the Hill have grown to such enormity that it's a different atmosphere.

M.O'R.: Would you say it was easier to get things done back in those days?

J.C.: Oh, yes. Very easy. Yeah, and so I really had a great time. Quigley from Pennsylvania - a politician from Pennsylvania was kind of a - he was a good old Irish politician, and I didn't - you know, everything was kind of fixed there. But then Udall brought in a guy by the name of Joe Moore from Texas, and he was a dynamo. And he tried to clean out the organization and ...

[interruption]

J.C.: So Moore - again I became an agent of change. Moore used me because he was trying to get around the hierarchies and the - you know, the deputy administrator and the people that had been there, you know, running the organization, and get to these regional administrators. And so I set up again meetings with regional administrators for him, and was very close to him as a guy who was going to help him change the organization. And that, of course, didn't make me too popular with my own boss and some other people, but you know, that's the way things go. It was pretty exciting.

M.O'R.: It sounds like it. Sounds like a very exciting time.

J.C.: Yeah. And so, you know, there was legislation, and then internal stuff for change, and Moore was really a - a really wonderful administrator.

[end of side one]

JACK CHURCHILL

TAPE 3, Side 2

March 27, 1996

J.C.: The biggest manipulation I ever did in my life was breaking the President's budget in the interregnum between the Johnson and the Nixon Administration. Because Joe Moore was obviously going out, you know, and I said, "Well, you know, now's the time to really go for the full appropriation for the sewage treatment plants," which was - at that point was going - under the '65 act was a billion dollars, grants to the communities for sewage treatment. And Congress had funded it at something like $400 million or something in the House Appropriations. And, you know, as usual the budgets did not meet what the authorization authorized.

So I had a little lunch with the head of the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the head of the Conservation Foundation, which was not Trane at the time; it was Art Somebody, and I forget the - long time ago - John Gunther was head of the U.S. Conference of Mayors. So I got the cities and the beneficiaries of this money and the environmentalists, which were the conservationists, which the Foundation kind of headed up - there was - Lawrence Rockefeller was chairman of the Conservation Foundation, and so that was kind of the nucleus of power for conservation.

And so then we decided - you know, at this luncheon we decided that now was the time to break the budget, and this was a great issue, you know, to fully fund this, and there were a lot of Congressmen sitting around not doing much and needed an issue, and

so we would try to get the budget increase in the House of Representatives. And of course the ideal guy for this is - you know, the guy that Wyden worked with in the House - what? - you know, the old man from Michigan; John ...

M.O'R.: I think I know who you mean, yeah.

J.C.: He was a fisherman. He was a big Isaac Walton - you know, the Isaac Walton League was the big backer of water quality, one of them. That and League of Women Voters. John - you know, he was chairman of Wyden's committee, you know. Still is. I mean, he's no longer the chairman, but - I guess he's leaving Congress. You know who I mean.

M.O'R.: Maybe I don't know who you mean.

J.C.: He's the most powerful man in Congress outside - you know, not in the appropriate area, but - John. Anyhow. Anyhow, he of course - Gunther said, you know, that, you know, they had all their contacts. I didn't know contacting in Congress, of course. But they got the - I gave them the names of the League people and you know, I gave them all the contacts [indiscernible]. So I just instigated this. I didn't play a big role in actually, you know, working the Congress, because that would have been a little dangerous, but it was the interregnum when nothing's going on, so it's an opportunity to move things, because you know, there's no control - everybody's sitting and waiting.

M.O'R.: For the new administration?

J.C.: Yeah. Yeah. So we got to the House floor, and an unheard-of thing, the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee went to the well of the House; he was just a subcommittee chair. And we

really - and we won. We got $850 million. We didn't quite get the billion dollars.

But I remember I was sitting there in the house, and of course all the League - you know, the League people are out, and Otis Pike - remember the Congressman Pike, who was the columnist? - came up to the gallery and was talking to the ladies right in front about what a great job they'd done.

But I was the instigator of all that.

M.O'R.: Well, maybe now might be a good time to take a little break; what do you think?

J.C.: Okay. Then let's go to the Tualatin.

M.O'R.: Yeah, that's right. Well, we're just about to seguey into that material.

J.C.: By way of background, eh?

[Break]

M.O'R.: Continuing the oral history with Jack Churchill after lunch on March 27th.

Well, we were just talking about some of the work you doing at the Water Quality Administration, and I guess the last thing we talked about was your coup in getting the funding restored for sewage treatment plants.

J.C.: Oh, yeah. Yeah. Well, then, you know, that kind of went along and we kind of got to the end of that period when Nixon came in, and that became - as I guess we discussed over lunch, Judge Trane came in as Undersecretary, and ...

M.O'R.: Undersecretary of ...

J.C.: ... of Interior. And so although there was a lot of fear that progress in water quality wouldn't continue, from what we saw it was very quickly - it was accelerated if anything, and that period began to unfold in Interior with Trane taking a very active role in the water quality program. In fact, he initiated what later I guess was not really supported by the courts, an industrial permit program that was basad upon - it was prior to the 1972 Act. Prior to that we just had water quality standards. They'd taken the Corps of Engineers' authority to regulate disposal in navigable waters and turned it into an industrial permit program, and it was later challenged because it didn't comply with national environmental policy, but during this period we set up the whole industrial permit program really through administrative action, so that's the type of thing that started to go on in the Nixon Administration, which if anything accelerated water quality. And of course there was a lot of fear of change, but at the same time the change was moving the program forward in leaps and bounds.

And Trane was former president of the National Environmental - the foundation, which Lawrence Rockefeller was president of, and he had Nixon's ear, and I think it convinced Nixon that the conservation vote was rapidly becoming the most important issue for the middle class swing vote, and that this was something that had to have a very high priority in his administration.

And of course what was evolving on the Hill was a contest between Johnson - or Ed Muskie of Maine and Jackson of Washington for the Democratic nomination, both struggling to be the leadership in the new environmental movement - and this was, of course, before 1970. It was leading up, between 1968 and '70.

M.O'R.: And so because of Nixon's - or because of Trane convincing Nixon of the importance of the environmental issue, Nixon really did get behind it?

J.C.: Yes. He allowed it to happen, and when the chips were down in the battles with the White House later on in terms of enforcement, we won a tremendous number of battles in the White House against [indiscernible] and so on.

For instance, after the 1972 Water Quality Act was passed and Ruckelshaus came in as Administrator, everything started moving - everything was moved into EPA, the water program there. Ruckelshaus went down to Atlanta, Georgia to the U.S. Conference of Mayors within two or three months of the formation of the agency, and cited practically from the platform of the Conference of Mayors at Atlanta for having a football stadium but no sewage treatment plant in Cincinnati, Ohio and another - and I think two or three cities had black mayors, and it was really a national commotion over the microphones at Ruckelshaus coming in and enforcing clean-up of the city. And then a week or two later ...

M.O'R.: This was at the conference?

J.C.: Oh, yeah. Yeah, and he came back the next day and was very much chuckling about it, and he said, you know, "I don't know where we're going, but at least we're getting motion started." At that time he had very open conferences with lots of staff, and even when they had national TV conferences with the staff once a month, just to bring the organization together. He had this very infectious sense of humor.

But within a week later we started an enforcement action against Armco Steel, which had been in the preparation for a long

time, but we kind of switched it over under the new Act - you know, to part of the new act. A lot of work of it was done, but we took on Armco Steel in Texas with - you know, and it was a battle in the White House, and Trane and Ruckelshaus won it.

And so I think that indicates, you know, the Nixon's decision, whatever the motivation. I have a heard time believing he had an environmental motivation, but he certainly had a political sense and made the right decision. That's kind of a crappy way to say it, because he did it, and he should stand on the record, you know. We don't want to give Nixon anything, us liberals.

But there's no question that the National Environmental Policy Act, which was passed in 1970 and which was authored by Senator Jackson, required annual reports, and the first Nixon report was 36 pages long of a report on the environment in the country. By the time of the Ford Administration the reports had gotten down to one page. So, you know, at this time and going into the '72 elections, you know, we had the Environmental Policy Act, we had the Clean Air Act in 1970 and we had the Clean Water Act in 1972, which really kind of - I didn't have a lot to do with the Clean Water Act of 1972. I wasn't in policy and legislation then. But I did - I was doing some work with the Hill on the citizen involvement and citizen enforcement activities, and was, you know, part of some of the work going on with the Muskie committee and the development of the bill. But that kind of - it changed the Administration and kind of changed their political liaisons with the Hill.

And so I was doing other things at the time, leading up to the passage of the Act. And then after passage of the Act I became very active in particularly non-point source regulation develop-

ment, and I did the - what they call the 404 program, the wetlands program, the Corps of Engineers and did a lot of kind of holding some of the programs on a kind of a quiet, stationary, just don't let them out of the bag too quick until we got some of the programs going, like of course the sewage treatment grant program, which all the construction people wanted. Money flowing is better than non-money flowing programs.

M.O'R.: You mentioned that - well, there was the earlier sewage treatment appropriation that you got restored. Was this the first time that the federal government really became actively involved?

J.C.: No. In '65 - actually, I think in '58 or - the sewage treatment legislation really goes back to just previous to World War II, when a Senator from Connecticut passed a Clean Water Act or Water Quality Act, but it got vetoed over a Supreme Court rider thing of some sort. And so we really didn't get started until 1958 on water quality national legislation. The states had done a lot, like the Oregon Sanitary Authority, you know, had started here and did a tremendous job in cleaning up the Willamette, even before the passage of national legislation.

But - and that's usually what happens; you know, eight or ten states get going on a program, and then it kind of becomes nationalized in some way in legislation. So by '58 the head of the Public Works Committee from Minnesota wrote a Water Quality Act, and it had a treatment grant program primarily directed to help small towns and small communities. And this was increased a little bit, but by '65 the cities saw this as a real public works program.

And it was particularly Mayor Daley of Chicago that saw this very clearly, and he had two of his Congressional henchmen - you know, two Congressmen, his representatives in Congress, the Mayor's representatives in Congress, and they were his representatives. And you know, in terms of - the Chicago machine was very strong then, and he could see very clearly that this was an avenue for public works for the cities. So the '65 act carried an authorization for a billion dollars, which by the '72 act the authorization went to $5 billion.

And Hugh Mills, who also worked for the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and John Gunther also was a paid consultant to Mayor Daley. And so, you know, I mean whatever went for Chicago, the bill - you know, I mean it was good for the country. I mean, there were two votes on the House Public Works Committee that, you know -. And so this was very important.

And of course the sanitary engineering profession was behind us because, you know, municipal waste treatment was a big thing, and the construction companies liked it because it provided funds for them. And so, you know, this was the money in the environmental - there wasn't much money in air quality. You know, and industry had to pay for it, and the same way in water quality, industry had to pay for it. But in the public sector we were going to get a lot of largess, and you know, and there's politics in that. There's always politics, and people make contributions; you know how it is.

M.O'R.: Right. Well, in fact I think Jack Smith talks a little bit about that period and some of these grants and felt, actually, that there was maybe almost too much money in the system.

J.C.: Well, looking back I think it was - you know, I thought it was a great thing at the time, you know, to get the - I don't know, it's coming out of the New Deal ethos, you saw large public works are a good thing. But in fact the worst thing ever to have - because you can't have development without sewers and roads, and if you really figure it out, probably what helped the sprawl in suburbia most was the sewage treatment grant. I've seen it happen in rural community after rural community - you know, just - if the communities had to pay for it themselves -.

And my own feeling is - quite early on was that it was a terrible mistake, that communities should have to pay for their own sewage, just like they usually pay for their own water supply. If there's anything that's local, it's sewage. There is no national rationale to have a grant program for it, except - you know, it just seems to me everybody ought to clean up their own personal waste and pay for it. It isn't just a matter of good old Yankee - you know, whatever.

But you know, I think that was the New Deal to its extreme, if you would.

M.O'R.: Although probably at the same time, if you're going to pass legislation mandating certain, you know, cleanliness levels in the waters, then ...

J.C.: No, I think you could have done it regulatorily.

M.O'R.: You could have?

J.C.: Oh, yes. I don't think there's any doubt. You say, you know, you're going to close down -. What they did was, you know, they just put a moratorium on growth. You know, and the development forces will say, "Well, let's raise a bond issue," and

they'll raise a bond issue. And they do that now, and they've closed down sewage treatment plants, and they'll raise a bond issue. Whose going to pay for the growth in Washington County? You know, they'll raise a bond issue. Who's going to pay for schools; what about schools? Same thing, you know. No, I think it was a terrible thing, the whole program.

M.O'R.: The whole program, eh?

J.C.: Yeah. I mean, it started out for little old rinky-dink rural areas and small towns, because that's what Blacknick of Minnesota had in his district. You know, and then when Daley got wind of it, "Well, we've got to have it for the big cities if we have it for the small towns," and you know, you have a big public works program, and well, for what? I mean, it was really for growth, for urban growth and sprawl.

M.O'R.: To make the world safe for developers, eh?

J.C.: Well, yeah, essentially. So you know, in the name of the environment we probably created more environmental degradation, if you really look at it seriously.

Or look at Washington County. If there was anybody that fed off the fat of that program, it was the Unified Sewerage Agency.

M.O'R.: Oh, yeah, they got almost all - I think all their plants were built with that money.

J.C.: Sure. Yeah.

M.O'R.: But that wasn't apparent to you at the time? You said you thought it was a good thing at the time?

J.C.: Well, I really didn't know what I was doing then. I mean, you know, I never really thought it out. We had - you know, I went into a program that was largely based upon sanitary

engineering, and you know, the biologists were there, and they'd tell you what water quality standards you needed for fish and so on, but largely it was a point source program, and it was, you know, in-plant control of taking the wastes out of the water, which is sanitary engineering.

And then you've got a regulatory contingent, headed by Murray Stein. He'd go around and hold, you know, kind of weak enforcement conferences. But largely it was just adding onto the pipe which takes impurities out, and the water quality program was always very much pipe-oriented. And the '72 Act they had a very small section of the Act that said "and non-point sources," and that's what I really started working on after the '72 Act. And at that time - it's probably more now - 50 percent of the pollution level that was in the nation's water that's the runoff from farm lands, forest lands, urban storm water runoff. So ...

M.O'R.: Now, you had said that you were working on non-point sources?

J.C.: Yes. Runoff over land. Non-point source is runoff over land.

M.O'R.: And you said you worked on strategy and regulations ...

J.C.: Right.

M.O'R.: ... for the Clean Water Act?

J.C.: Mm-hmm.

M.O'R.: What sorts of things did that comprise, exactly?

J.C.: Well, I think the major thrust I did at that point was in terms of - well, for a while there in carrying out the Act I ran a branch which you were connected with, it was going around getting

licenses for the upcoming atomic power plants, and I ran around the country and visited most of the power plants, held conferences with AEC, and we - our laboratory in Michigan - or Minnesota and in Corvallis, they had teams of people that dealt with plumes and - so it was the water aspects of those plants.

I worked on that for a while and headed that program and got it started and so on, and then I focused on the non-point source things. And so I developed - well, we developed this best management practices strategy, which was analogous to the - in the Act it provided that industrial wastes and municipal wastes would receive what they called best practical - well, best available treatment if they were in - if it was needed, but what the technology called for, the permit would be whatever technology would be available, the best available technology or best - whatever. I forget now the words - those bureaucratic words, I've forgotten now.

So we developed something analogous, which was probably a mistake, called best management practices, and we took these from the Soil Conservation Service and the Forest Service. But most of the Soil Conservation Service things were engineering practices, how you did things on land, not - you know, plowed across the land and not up and down the hill, and - same thing with the urban storm water. Started to develop criteria for these practices and put out books and do all the things that you do in a program.

What I was doing primarily was getting other agencies involved, and so I got very closely involved with the Forest Service, and tried really probably to get them to take over the program, or a large part of it, and to - and it was probably a strategic error, because the land management agencies could never

have water as a goal, although we thought they should have water quality. I think we didn't look at the reality, but they had the bureaucracy out there, and the water quality people didn't - and never dealt anything with farmers or with forest people. You know, they were hype-intensive.

So here we had this burgeoning program that was going to be land extensive, and how do you go about doing this if you don't use the agencies that are out there servicing the land or the people that are engaged in those management activities? Well, we thought we could - what do you - you know, take them over or, you know, get them to work for us or something. That was the strategy, and I sold it. I thought it would be good. I had come from that tradition, you know, the land management tradition, and I thought, "Oh, yeah. Those guys are good people, and, you know, their heart's in the right place."

The only problem is their whole ethos is related to the land and not - and just up to the edge of the stream. They've never dealt with the stream in their thinking. They just look at land. You know, the stream runs through, well, they take the water out and put it on the land or something. Or they'll go fishing, but it's not related to their view of soil and water as it relates to agriculture or forestry. I mean, it's just the way it is.

And certainly as the so-called science of forestry developed into forest engineering, how to get trees out had nothing to do with the water. And that has evolved, you know, since pretty much the 50's.

But anyhow, I worked very directly with pretty able people in the Forest Service and with Trane that these would be done, and who

had taken over the agency by then after Ruckelshaus had left, and he was - I worked kind of with Trane, and he would pitch in and talk with the Secretary and get stuff going, and we'd have lunches at the Cosmos Club and iron things out, you know, between the Forest Service and water quality, and all sorts of things like that at the higher level, and then I established seven regional conferences on forestry with - we had all the timber-producing vice presidents in from all the companies, all the state foresters in. Going to get Forest Management Practice Act to get in their water quality stuff. We had a lot of rough going, you know, because timber vice presidents in Louisiana aren't necessarily cotton up to the feds coming down and telling them how to cut their trees. And so, you know, we had a lot of shouting. and particularly in New England and the Southeast and Texas, Louisiana, it was really rough going. And by the time you got to Oregon, it was more - they'd been under the Forest Practices Act, so at least they were polite about it.

And in the same way, I worked - not on the Soil Conservation Service, but the National Association of Soil Conservation Districts, and we'd give all - and then I'd give money to the League of Women Voters to hire a person, and the National Association of Counties for storm waters, and the League of Cities. And they all put people on their staffs and developed, you know, direction and guidelines and things like that on how you do this stuff, and so we were, you know, developing a program.

And then did the same thing with the Conservation Foundation, developed citizen handbooks, how to get involved and how to get

citizen involvement in the decision-making process, because there were sections that actually called for public involvement.

And this was necessary - there was a whole wide range of things that I was pretty heavily involved in.

M.O'R.: And so from that work, you came out again to Oregon in 1976 to go to work for DEQ about the state law?

J.C.: In '76, yeah.

M.O'R.: And that was also non-point source ...

J.C.: Yeah. A guy by the name of Kramer was head of the program for Bob Straub, Governor Straub, in the Department of Environmental Quality, and he couldn't get his people in the Water Division to really get into the non-point sources, and so I had gone by and chatted with him one time about that he ought to get started.

So he called me one day and said how would I like to come out and do it? And I said, "Well, I think I'd like to leave Washington and do it." So you know, I kind of had it in the back of my mind that maybe I'd just get out and come back with the next administration and go political rather than just kind of a bureaucratic level. I was kind of at the top of the - almost at the top of the bureaucratic level, and I thought, "Well, I need to get out of here, anyhow."

M.O'R.: So you thought you might go into politics?

J.C.: Well, I might come back as a political appointee.

M.O'R.: Okay. I see.

J.C.: Rather than [indiscernible]. That was the way - salary-wise it would make sense, and then, you know, job-wise it made sense, and so -.

And you know, the Democrats were going to come back, I think it was the next administration, so, you know, why not get out - had good Democratic credentials. So anyhow, you know, and I kind of wanted to get back to Oregon mostly, anyhow. I wanted to see the mountains. I had been in Washington too long.

So anyhow, I did, and you know, I came back and set up the non-point source program, and one of the first things we did was I hired a guy from - Dave Ricker from the Geological Survey and a team to go around and work with citizens and identify all the non-point source problems in the state and draw these big maps, and you know, had them printed and everything.

[end of tape]