

COMMITTEE FOR NEW CHINA POLICY

Testimony submitted. Not scheduled to appear.

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TESTIMONY PREPARED FOR THE REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM COMMITTEE
August 14, 1972 - Miami Beach, Florida

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FOR A NEW U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA - NOW.*
by Daniel Tretiak**

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The 1972 Republican Convention has an historic opportunity: to advocate that, if President Nixon is re-elected to another term in the White House, it will back him up 100% in going the final steps toward normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) by extending full diplomatic recognition to that nation.

Great credit has been and should be given to the President for beginning the reversal of America's disastrous and wrong policy toward the PRC of the past 22 years. Much has been accomplished, although even more needs to be done. The main accomplishments should be enumerated.

First, the Nixon Administration has made China "in" in the U.S. It is no longer virtually treasonous to talk favorably about China; instead it is in vogue to do so. Leading Republican and Democratic politicians now vie with one another to go to Peking; this would have been unheard of 18 months ago. The tragic effects of the McCarthy era on the U. S. body politic and academic have been almost totally removed during the past two years. That is a major achievement; as one active in the study of contemporary China, the politics of the PRC, as well as in advocating that the U.S. adopt a genuinely new China policy, I consider it no mean one. The one political effort designed to turn the clock back on the question of U. S. policy toward China -- Congressman Ashbrook's abortive Presidential candidacy -- has been thoroughly and thankfully repudiated by the Republican Party.

Second, a whole host of old, hostile policies toward China has been scrapped: from passport restrictions to trade barriers to how we officially and unofficially refer to the Chinese Government. We now call it by its legitimate name, the People's Republic of China, just as

* Chairman and Co-Chairman
1971-72

*I regret very much that the extreme pressure of academic responsibilities at this time prevents me from being in Miami Beach to present this testimony in person, as would have been proper and as was our Committee's wish. Notwithstanding, I truly hope that you will give this presentation your serious consideration.

we call other countries by their legitimate political names.

Third, the President has really extended de facto recognition to the PRC by his announcement of July 15, 1971 and, more importantly, by his extremely important visit to China earlier this year. While some people -- in both political parties -- feel that that visit was mainly for headline grabbing, I think it is important to point out that it was really important for Richard M. Nixon (and Mao Tse-tung) to personally bury the hatchet that has harmed Sino-American relations for 22 years. This action could not have been done by any other American official and it had to be done in a State visit. It is really enough to say that important Chinese officials in public and in private called Mr. Nixon's decision to come to China "a courageous act." They did not view it as an act of surrender nor certainly as an act of conquest. Rather, having spent a month in China just before the President went there and having participated in discussions during that visit with Chinese as high-ranking as Premier Chou En-lai as well as with peasants in remote villages, I am convinced that the Chinese perceived the visit as an act of statesmanship which they hoped would lead to improved Sino-American relations.

Because, ladies and gentlemen, on more than one occasion since the end of World War II, we know that the Chinese Communists -- both before and after defeating Chiang Kai-shek's U.S.-supported but hapless armies -- made subtle and not-so-subtle overtures to the U. S. to try to improve relations with our country. Regretfully, until this Administration took office, our Government did not respond to those overtures, let alone take initiatives to improve U.S.-Chinese relations.

Even now, we have not yet gone the full journey toward normalization, whatever one may think of how far we have progressed thus far. Hence, on behalf of the Committee For New China Policy and in my own name, I urge this Republican Convention not only to approve what the President has done so far vis-à-vis the PRC, but to urge him to take the final steps which the Shanghai Communique did not take:

1. Recognize that the Peoples' Republic of China is the sole, legitimate government of China.
2. Terminate all official relations with the Chiang Kai-shek government-in-exile on Taiwan; in the Shanghai Communique, as you know, the President pledged himself, on behalf of the U. S. Government, not to support any "two-China's," "one-China, one-Taiwan," or "Taiwan Independent Movement" schemes. Hence, I urge you not to entertain any illusions that any of the aforementioned are viable solutions to the Taiwan question: they are not and the President knows it.
3. State explicitly that the future of Taiwan is a matter for the Chinese authorities and people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits to settle, period.

If this plank on China sounds like bitter medicine for some of you, let me point out that a lot of it is de facto U. S. policy already. What is necessary is for us to make it de jure national policy and that can only come about through an exchange of ambassadors

between Washington and Peking. I think this Republican can and should adopt such a policy plank because:

1. If the U. S. doesn't do so soon, the Japanese will give ^{us} a "Tanaka-shoku" along those lines -- although Japan should not necessarily determine U. S. policy;
2. If Senator McGovern were to be elected President, he will undoubtedly enact policy along those lines -- although Senator McGovern should not necessarily determine U. S. policy;
3. Many of our Allies and friends are recognizing China, in part because they don't want to be caught napping when we recognize the PRC -- but those allies and friends should not necessarily determine U. S. policy;
4. The possibility always exists that the USSR will improve relations with China, thereby, as in 1949 and 1950, making China less interested in better relations with the U. S. -- although the USSR should by no means necessarily determine U. S. policy.

U.S. policy should be determined by what is in the best interests of the United States. I happen to think strongly that it is in the best interests of the U. S. to deal forthrightly, formally, honestly, directly, even in disagreement from time to time, with the PRC. One-fourth of mankind live in that country, whose past and present we are only slowly starting to understand and accept, interpret and reinterpret as we face its reality after 22 years of physical isolation from it. We are realizing that the so-called "China threat" of the past 22 years has been a myth of catastrophic proportions, one which intellectually, politically and financially we can no longer afford to believe in and support.

U. S. policy toward China since 1949 has not been very favorable, to put it mildly. That has been a bi-partisan error. The Committee For New China Policy has been critical of U. S. policy in the past toward China, has praised initiatives of the President to change that policy as well as the support given him in that endeavor by Democratic political leaders (e.g., Senators McGovern, Kennedy and Gravel). It has urged that a new one-China policy be adopted and that both Parties encourage and support that adoption.

Earlier, I referred to the failure of the U.S. to respond to Chinese initiatives to improve bilateral relation. That failure was at least in part a Republican failure, it must be said in all candor. It was, after all, John Foster Dulles, a Republican, who refused to even shake hands with Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai during the Geneva negotiations of 1954, who threatened to "unleash" Chiang Kai-shek against the PRC, who failed to respond to PRC initiatives in 1955 and 1956 to allow exchanges of journalists between our two countries. It was the late Dwight D. Eisenhower who threatened his successor, the late John F. Kennedy, that he (Eisenhower) would publicly rebuke him (Kennedy) if the latter took any steps whatsoever to improve Sino-American relations. (Kennedy didn't.) And, worst of all, certainly, it was the infamous Senator Joseph McCarthy who destroyed a small but important national treasure, our China specialists of the early 1950's in Government and in

the Universities with his unproven attacks that these individuals were "soft on Chinese Communism," that they caused the U. S. to "lose" a China that wasn't "ours;" those specialists merely saw that America's national interests in the world demanded that we take account of and deal with the PRC, not necessarily because they liked it, its leaders or its beliefs -- but because it was there. It has taken 22 years and two Wars in Asia for us to accept that reality. Richard M. Nixon, who -- it must be said -- rose to power in part on the McCarthy-ite wave of terror, has had the courage to, in effect, admit by his actions that previous U. S. -- Republican and Democratic ⁻⁻⁻ policy toward the PRC was wrong and has undertaken to change it.

I urge you to applaud that action. But I also urge you to go much further* write into the Platform a specific plank which will urge President Nixon to take the final steps in righting a great wrong in American foreign policy, policy toward China. 1972 is the year for the Republican Party to provide strong support and encouragement for the President on this vital issue.

-END-

* Daniel Tretiak is Lecturer in Political Science at York University in Toronto, Canada; and Research Associate with the IREA Project at Cornell University. He is former Chairman and Co-Chairman of the Committee for New China Policy, and is currently a Vice-Chairman of that organization. He has lived in H⁰ng Kong for three years, is a specialist in Chinese foreign policy having written numerous articles in academic journals and newspapers on the subject. From mid-January to mid-February of this year, he was a leader of the CNCP delegation which visited China at the invitation of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs. He reads and speaks Chinese fluently and has conducted numerous discussions with Chinese officials in Canada, the United Nations and in China about various aspects of Sino-American relations.

**UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
**S.J. Res. 48, S. Res. 18, S. Res. 37, S. Res. 82,
and S. Res. 139**

JUNE 24, 25, 28, AND 29 AND JULY 20, 1971



Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

70-772

WASHINGTON : 1972

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price \$2.50

STATEMENT OF DANIEL TRETIAK, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE FOR NEW CHINA POLICY,
"FUTURE PERSPECTIVE ON UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS", JULY 23, 1971

(By Daniel Tretiak¹)

I am grateful in an organizational sense to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for giving me the opportunity to present this testimony as the Chair-

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Author's Note: Because of time constraints, it was not possible for this document to be circulated to the entire National Board of CNCP and therefore should not be construed as necessarily representing the opinion of the Board. The author does wish, however, to acknowledge the assistance of those members of the Board who aided the author in the preparation of this document: John Fincher, Thomas B. Manton, Ishwer C. Ojha, Henry Rosenant, Jr., and Louis Douglas Tretiak.

A copy of the CNCP Statement of Policy is attached to this statement for the Committee's reference.

man of the first American political, non-tax-exempt organization to advocate publicly an unequivocal new U.S. policy toward China, the first American organization which, more than two years ago, not only began lobbying in the Congress for a new U.S. policy toward China, but began engaging China officials in meaningful and substantive, often harmonious but sometimes acrimonious dialogues in third countries about the problems which have divided the U.S. and China for so long.

NEW POLICIES FOR A NEW ERA

These Senate hearings are held at a historic but ironic period in the history of America's relations with China. While the future course of those relations remains to be determined, extremely significant steps to improve relations have been taken by both Peking and Washington, despite the doubts and suspicions from those in both countries that genuine improvement in Sino-American relations could occur.

This is a long overdue period in the history of our two countries; sadly, the obstacles to improvement have mainly been on our side. Happily, however, the Nixon Administration—more than many of its erstwhile Democratic critics—now-supporters and Republican supporters—now-critics—has realized that the first steps in the journey of 10,000 li must be taken by the U.S., however difficult it may have been for us to recognize that our policies toward China have been wrong and not the reverse. But Chinese responses to the once-seemingly small steps of the Nixon Administration have been neither excessively obsequious—no one should have expected otherwise—nor have they been as stubborn and unyielding as some Americans expected (and perhaps even some Chinese would have preferred). Instead the momentum in improvement in Sino-American relations has been nothing short of dazzling: from ping-pong diplomacy, extensive and intensive semi-official contacts between Americans and Chinese especially in Ottawa, lifting of the trade embargo, and finally the stunningly gratifying news that Henry Kissinger and several of his aides had visited Peking and arranged for President Nixon to travel to China between now and next May, with a reciprocal visit by Chou En-Lai to the U.S. also in the offing.

The significance of these latest events should in no way be underestimated: the skeptics and critics in China and the U.S. should be thoroughly disarmed, although one should not question their right to speak out against the President's decisions, even if those skeptics and critics might have questioned the right—even the patriotism—of those of us who in the past spoke out for a new China policy and now speak out strongly in favor of the President's new China policy. Ironically, that policy only a short time ago would have been considered radical yea, even unpatriotic, I say "the President's new China policy" because his speech of July 15 unmistakably implies—even if it does not explicitly commit himself to—the establishment of an entirely new set of relations between the United States and China.

Several of my colleagues in the academic community have used this forum to regurgitate the sins—and they are manifold—in past U.S. policy toward China. In light of the excellence of their comments—but also in the spirit of the genuinely new era in Sino-American relations which we are now entering—let me endorse their critiques, but focus on the future, because that is where new opportunities—and let us not delude ourselves—new pitfalls may lie. The lessons of the past may have but limited utility.

As is noted below, the U.N. hurdle must be resolved in China's favor; no gimmicks whatsoever should be advanced by the U.S. side against China, unless, of course, the Chinese government demonstrates a most unlikely willingness to compromise on the Taiwan question at the U.N.

However, U.S.-China relations, as President Nixon's trip to China will show, involve more than the successful resolution of the "China representation" question at the U.N. We must consider certain other aspects of Sino-American relations on their own merits, as well as within the framework particularly of our policy toward the rest of Asia.

While I do not want to use your valuable time to recite history, we must use this new era in Sino-American relations to realize that the problems of Asia cannot be resolved unless China plays an active role in their resolution. Because we have failed to accept the central political reality of Asia, China, we have fought two exhausting, demoralizing and tragic wars in Asia since World War II. All efforts which have even a chance of leading to a mutual Sino-American

accommodation which will prevent more Vietnams are certainly worth the work involved. We can no longer ignore China, even if we may take some time to live in perfect harmony with it.

The new direction in our policy toward China will make increasingly less necessary the need for the U.S. to maintain a high military posture in Asia or to encourage our allies to do so. China has, even during periods of Sino-American hostility and tension, been remarkably non-belligerent vis-à-vis Asian neighbors. A China at peace with the U.S. will not want to risk that peace by threatening militarily Asian countries friendly to the U.S. or neutral between the Major Powers. Furthermore, as the Vice-President did recently in South Korea, our Asian allies should be encouraged to understand and accept our motives for improving relations with China. Additionally, as has occurred particularly in Southeast Asia, various nations should be encouraged or supported by the U.S. to reach political accommodations with a China willing to enter into such accommodations. The peace of Asia—which so dramatically affects the peace of the world as well as our own Nation—really demands no less.

U.S. amity with China should not be seen as a zero-sum game in terms of our relations with Asia's two other Major Powers, Japan and the USSR. In fact, for the past twenty years, their relations with China have had that unfortunate effect on Sino-American relations. Particularly in the Japanese case, we should use our good offices in both Peking and Tokyo to discourage Sino-Japanese mistrust, not exploit it to no one's real advantage. Taking a brief historical look backward, Sino-Japanese hostility in the inter-War period bode ill for the U.S. by 1941. Hopefully, we can learn from that lesson.

The Taiwan question, certain Chinese claims to the contrary, will not be easy to resolve. But certain assumptions will have to be accepted by the U.S.; for the Chinese People's Republic (CPR), Taiwan is more a question of legitimacy than of territoriality—although that question will have to be faced some day, as well; second, however difficult it may be for some American decision-makers, the U.S. cannot expect to impose its wishes on the CPR, as the latter government and people attempt to resolve the Taiwan question with the authorities and people on Taiwan. In this connection, two myths should be discarded: Taiwan's "uniqueness" and "the bloodbath theory." Taiwanese, like the majority of the inhabitants on the Mainland, are Han Chinese; they are dissimilar from many Mainlanders, but we should not forget the heterogeneity—and homogeneity—that exists in China, even if few of us have had the opportunity to observe the regional and provincial diversity of Chinese life since 1949. As for the bloodbath theory, it should be realized that: first, the Taiwanese military establishment is one of Asia's strongest, as long as the troops remain loyal to their commanders. Only an all-out CPR onslaught on Taiwan could conquer the island. Second, and more importantly, if the CPR is genuinely committed to better relations with the U.S., it will realize that those relations could be jeopardized by an armed attack on Taiwan. To sum up, however, the United States, if it is to have a new policy toward China, must understand that it cannot dictate to China the terms of the settlement of the Taiwan question, which is, after all, an internal Chinese matter.

Beyond the resolution of outstanding problems like the Taiwan one, we should look forward to well-rounded, increasingly normal relations between China and the United States. The U.S. Government should not merely end partially the trade embargo with China, but expand the list of salable items as well as make Export-Import Bank loans available to finance future Sino-American trade, thereby actively encouraging U.S. businessmen to trade with China. Most-favored nation status should be accorded China in future foreign trade. Furthermore, the U.S. should begin making plans for extending foreign aid to China, if the CPR is interested in seeking assistance, and on terms fully acceptable to the Chinese. However, if China is unprepared, uninterested or unwilling to accept government-to-government aid, private U.S. citizens should be encouraged to travel to China for varying lengths of time in order to contribute their knowledge to the Chinese in fields determined by the Chinese; additionally, public and private American institutions should be encouraged to provide funds and facilities for Chinese teachers and students to travel and study in this country.

Our policy of military threats to China must end. The first step toward terminating that threat is to prevent the transfer of nuclear missiles from Okinawa to Taiwan in 1972; next, all nuclear weapons should be removed from Taiwan; and finally, our military presence on and around that island—already in the process of being reduced—should be removed.

For the first time in the long Chinese-American relationship, both countries will have to learn to deal with each other as equals. Our leaders seem already to have begun to accept this reality; I hope that they will set the tone for other Americans in this area. Additionally, after 20 years of non-contact we and the Chinese run the grave risk of having excessively high expectations about how far and how fast our mutual relations may develop—and concomitant disappointment and disillusionment. (I tend to feel the problem may be more severe on the American side.) But here again, the relatively slow but steady improvement in the state of Sino-American relations—coupled with the disastrous impact on those relations of the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in April-May 1970—may have helped to prepare both sides against pendulum swings from unwarranted optimism to unnecessary military high risk-taking.

TOWARD A NEW BIPARTISANSHIP IN U.S.-CHINA POLICY

I suggested earlier that these hearings were held in an ironic period in our Nation's history. Let the ironies be spelled out explicitly; the correct, even courageous moves that President Nixon has taken—had they been carried out by a Democratic President—would almost certainly have brought charges of "appeasement" and "being soft on Chinese Communism" against a Democratic President by a Richard Nixon not in the White House. It is no wonder that some Democratic Party leaders were somewhat slow to applaud initiatives taken in March and April of this year to improve Sino-American relations. But as I have stressed in private discussions with several Democratic Senators as well as with Chinese diplomats during frequent discussions in Ottawa, it would be self-defeating to assume that this Administration was not moving to begin fundamental changes in U.S. policy toward China. Quite obviously, that is precisely the direction in which the Administration has been moving, as the President's dramatic announcement of July 15 confirmed.

For the past half-decade this country has been divided by the bipartisan disaster that has been the Vietnam War. Few of us can remember, certainly not I, the divisive role that U.S. policy toward China played in the U.S. body politic 20 years ago. Another irony of today's Sino-American relationship is that it provides an opportunity to build a new bi-partisanship of peace—of neither war nor hostility—between the U.S. and China. I was profoundly encouraged by the statesmanlike praise given the President's pre- (and post-) July 15 initiatives toward China by Senators Gravel, Kennedy and McGovern in their testimonies before this Committee. *Political rivalries aside, the Nation and the international community deserved no less.* Their position—and that of the President—points the way toward a positive, new bipartisan U.S. policy toward China.

The President should be encouraged by Democrats and Republicans alike to continue to move as dramatically forward in the coming months as he has in the past few ones. Such bi-partisan support for a new China policy should not be unconditional, however; particularly those Democrats who have had the courage to speak out early on the Chinese issue should quietly but firmly make it clear to the President that their support does not extend to any efforts the Administration may be contemplating to attempt to block the CPR's resumption of its rightful seats in the U.N. on China's terms. How ludicrous and counterproductive in terms of the Administration's own policy-goals toward China would it be if on the one hand the President were speaking about traveling to China to discuss normalization of relations with that nation and simultaneously attempting to prevent China from resuming those positions in the world community which American policy, more than any other nation's has attempted to deny.

I would like to conclude my call for genuine bipartisanship on the China issue by offering the suggestion that I do not believe that President Nixon's July 15 speech means anything other than that the US will acquiesce in the CPR's assuming its rightful seats in the UN in the Fall of 1971, however bitter a pill that may be for some members of the Administration to swallow. The Chiang Kai-shek government-in-exile should be allowed to continue to regard us as its friend if it wishes, but we should not allow it to block any longer the normalization of relations between the US and the CPR, either in the UN or, sooner rather than later, in Washington.

CHINESE RESPONSIVENESS

Any discussion which deals essentially with U.S. policy toward China should *ipso facto* focus on what U.S. policy toward China should be. But as we in the

Committee For New China Policy have advocated—and the Administration seems to have felt it was not a bad idea, either—it has been essential for U.S. policy to take full account of Chinese policy goals and style of operation.

For many years, Sino-American relations seemed like two boats, passing in the night, taking little if any note of one another—save for hostile words and hostile acts. While none of us should fault this Administration for its efforts to improve Sino-American relations, I think one should not avoid paying tribute to the responsiveness of the Chinese Governments to U.S. Government initiatives. The seemingly small gesture of the Administration in canceling passport restrictions was quickly followed by the advent of ping-pong diplomacy, which in turn led almost immediately to a period of semi-official and now virtually official Sino-American relations.

Old beliefs about the US die hard in China, as those about China will take time to die in the U.S. The deftness with which a Chou En-lai deals with high-ranking Americans may not be matched by other Chinese who still retain their grave doubts and suspicions of U.S. motives and behavior, who do not readily forget that the U.S. still maintains a large military presence in Asia aimed mainly at China, and who hold ideological beliefs sharply different from those of most Americans.

Hence, in this current period of self-praise, we should not for a moment forget that the Chinese government has, in recent months, had to make tough decisions: in the absence of an agreement on the Taiwan question or the lifting of the trade embargo, China permitted American athletes, journalists and scientists to travel to China; Chinese diplomats in Ottawa also unstintingly gave of their time and energies, often under trying conditions, to deal with Americans of varied political persuasions and professions. With the lifting of the US trade embargo, but with the Taiwan question still unresolved, the Chinese Government has invited the U.S. President to visit a China which the U.S. does not yet officially recognize.

While some people may rail against being taken in by Chinese smiles or claim that Chinese policy toward the outside world has not changed, let me assure you that after numerous visits to Ottawa Chinese officials do not always smile at Americans and that any Chinese Government which invites Richard Nixon to visit China must be in the process of changing its policies in a more than superficial way.

The truth of the matter is that the Chinese and American boats have finally met in daylight, not at night, and have found that their mutual fears, suspicions, hostilities and hatred may well have been exaggerated. Consequently, their courses may cross more frequently, but there is no need to assume that more discord will occur in Sino-American relations in the next few years than in any other set of bilateral relations involving Major Powers.

COMMITTEE FOR NEW CHINA POLICY—POLICY STATEMENT


The Committee for New China Policy advocates a new United States policy toward China which recognizes that the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate government of China. We will work for a United States policy of peace, understanding, and cooperation with the People's Republic of China. We recognize that such a policy must inevitably lead to a new approach by the United States toward Asia as a whole.

In order to move toward the new China policy we advocate, our government should:

1. Recognize that Taiwan is Chinese territory (as the United States did prior to the Korean War) and accept the position that, whatever the complexities of transition from the present political situation, the United States has no responsibility for determining the future status of Taiwan.
2. Adhere strictly to international law and refrain from intervention in China's internal affairs; withdraw American forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait; and terminate all military, political and economic aid to Chinese Nationalist authorities.
3. End the current policy of military encirclement and trade embargo of China, and eliminate all punitive and discriminatory trade regulations.
4. Bring the American involvement in the Indochina War to a speedy and unconditional conclusion since the continuation of that involvement increases the possibility of war with China.

5. Acknowledge that the government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate representative of China in the United Nations and in all other international organizations.

6. Establish economic, social, cultural, and diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual respect, and non-intervention in each other's affairs.



The New York Times/July 11, 1972

Whatever Happened to China?

By DANIEL TRETIAK

ITHACA, N.Y. — George McGovern announced his candidacy for the Presidency by calling for a total reappraisal of U.S. policy toward Asia, especially the People's Republic of China. That was a very courageous position for a Democratic politician — let alone a then long-shot Presidential candidate — to take. But McGovern took it, although he was subsequently preempted on the China issue by Richard Nixon.

But somehow, in the justifiable rush to nail down the Presidential nomination—first against overwhelming odds and then against a last-ditch, gutter-level effort by his opponents to deny him the nomination—the China issue has been lost. But has it?

Despite McGovern's own position on the China issue, is his party still suffering from a McCarthy period hangover on China? Is it thin-skinned, refusing to admit that a wrong China policy was sealed under Harry S. Truman in the late summer of 1950? And is it sympathetic to the proposition that maybe the proponents in this country of an "independent Taiwan" have a legitimate case? It is lamentable but necessary to say a little bit of yes to all of these questions.

The McCarthy hangover is seen in the proposed Democratic party platform. At that time, while most attention was understandably being focused on the fighting in the Credentials Committee, it was still astonishing to note that not even one innocuous word about U.S. policy toward China appeared in the proposed platform!

Clearly the Democrats did not want to go out on a limb on the China question even though their probable announced his candidacy for the Presidency had done so eighteen months

earlier and his opponent seems to have fully defused China as an issue in U.S. domestic politics (witness the Ashbrook campaign).

At least some Democrats are quite touchy when reminded that former President Truman really sealed the fate of our China policy right after the Korean war began. On Jan. 22, I testified before the Democratic party Platform Committee in New York at a meeting chaired by W. Averell Harriman, advocating that the platform include a plank calling for recognition of the China, breaking of relations with the Taiwan Government and having the Taiwan question be solved by the Chinese authorities and people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Harriman was visibly angered when I blamed our past China policy in part on the Democrats, arising from our misperceptions of China's role in the Korean war. In angry, partisan pique, he blamed Dulles' polimy of "unleashing Chiang" for our present dilemma. However he was silent when I pointed out that when President Truman placed the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits in the summer of 1950, he explicitly broke his January 1950 pledge that the U.S. would not interfere in the Chinese civil war. The presence of that fleet clearly prevented the Chinese Communists from finishing Chiang off. Whatever happened after that was a function of a bipartisan airtight China policy.

Finally it is difficult to measure the impact on the U.S. body politic of the Taiwan Independence Movement or World United Formosans for Independence. One incident may reveal more than meets the eye. After my testimony, the "minister of external affairs" of the latter group testified; not one person in the audience applauded when he finished. Neverthe-

less, I had a long discussion with a very serious and undoubtedly sincere supporter of Senator McGovern after the meeting; although this individual supported the South Dakotan, was for unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam regardless of the consequences, and discounted the validity of the "blood-bath" theory in Vietnam—he was 100 per cent for Taiwan independence.

He denied that Taiwan was a province of China, that Taiwanese were Chinese, that they spoke Chinese. He provided "sophisticated" guesstimates about how many people living on Taiwan favored the Chiang regime, the People's Republic, a Japanese return or an independent Taiwan all unprovable in the atmosphere of "free" China.

Clearly, the Nixon Administration, in the Shanghai communiqué of Feb. 27, 1972, showed greater realism on the Taiwan question than that Democratic voter with whom I discussed the issue, Mr. Harriman and the Platform Committee, which simply dodged the China issue.

Isn't it time that the Democratic party cleaned up its record on the China question now? It is so safe to demand anything on Vietnam — but why ignore China? Why leave the field to the President? Why not a bipartisan one-China policy, now?

Daniel Tretiak is lecturer in political science at York University in Toronto.

ERRATA

Paragraph 5, line 3: add "nominee" after "probable"

Paragraph 6, line 5: change "Jan." to "June"

Paragraph 7, line 6: change "polimy" to "policy"

Paragraph 7, last line: change "airtight" to "anti-"