JACK SMITH

TAPE 6, Side 1

February 2, 1996

M.O'R.: This is a continue of the interview with Jack Smith on February 2nd, 1996.

I see. So it's a question of what can the court do, then?

J.S.: Well, yeah. You need to provide something for the court to do, and if both parties come and say, "Well, you've given us an impossible task," if they're persuasive, "You've given us an impossible task; we could never do what we were originally ordered to do even though we agreed to do it at the time," you know, it's simply a matter of whose argument is more persuasive to the court, but there is that sort of uncertainty, and it's what - at any rate, that's a primary reason why there wasn't - you know, why NEDC and others didn't go back to court years and years ago, and at some point you simply have no alternative. My sense is that's about where NEDC and the State of Oregon are these days.

M.O'R.: Did Judge Burns in fact throw anyone in jail?

J.S.: He didn't. He threatened to. He threatened to throw the Attorney General of the United States in jail.

M.O'R.: Right. Ed Meese. You told me about that. So presumably he'd make similar threats again, if need be?

J.S.: I don't know the answer to that. And since you don't know the answers very well, and they appear to be sufficiently whimsical, you don't undertake this going into court very lightly.

M.O'R.: But someone did go into court about a year ago, you said. Was that NEDC?

J.S.: It was NEDC and another environmental organization, Northwest Environmental Advocates, went back to court with a petition that DEQ publish these water quality limited - produce these lists of water quality limited waters in a more timely fashion than they had been.

M.O'R.: And what was the outcome of that one?

J.S.: It produced the lists quite promptly, and as we speak it's out for public review.

M.O'R.: That's right. You mentioned that earlier. So they needed a little prodding.

So are you still actively involved with NEDC at this point?

J.S.: No, I haven't been for quite a number of years. When I retired, I retired as president, I retired from the board and went back to doing my more professional things. I mean, I talk to people that are at NEDC. I talk to quite a few people in environmental organizations, but I don't have anything to do with the organization.

M.O'R.: Who's pressing things forward for NEDC now?

J.S.: Well, the current president, who has been president for the last quite a few years is an attorney named Karl Anuta, who works in a law firm downtown.

M.O'R.: And how has your retirement been? You say you're back to primarily a professional involvement with these issues, so what kinds of professional work are you doing?

J.S.: What do I do for a living?

M.O'R.: Well, no, not precisely that, but just what sorts of things are you up to these days?

J.S.: Actually I spend a fair amount of time on these TMDL kinds of issues, really as a technical consultant to similar kinds of litigation in other parts of the country. Currently working a case in Georgia and West Virginia, Louisiana, New York state, for example. One in the state of Washington by some of the same parties, but the kinds of litigation these days really more in the Eastern part of the country are by a whole spectrum of different parties. They're all the same lawsuit against the EPA for other states failing to do the same thing that the State of Oregon has failed to do and EPA has failed to do.

M.O'R.: So your clients, then, are environmental organizations, or -?

J.S.: They're environmental - I think the answer is yeah, regardless of what the names or - some sort of river basin something; basically they're environmental organizations, some of whom are narrowly concerned with a specific quality of water and a specific river basin. Some like Sierra Club are heavily involved in - actually, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund - in some of the cases in the South. Their interests are quite a lot more broad than - just kind of general environmental rather than specifically water quality.

And then I do some purely - that's kind of legal policy kind of work, and then I do a reasonable amount of purely technical work for people like the City of Portland, sometimes for Unified Sewerage Agency that I've worked for on a number of things.

M.O'R.: Actually, I meant to ask you one other question about USA, too, and that was that you'd said earlier on, I think maybe in our first conversation, that some of the people there, I think

notably Stan Leseur, felt pretty positive about all of this from the very beginning. Maybe I'm misquoting you, but I'm wondering if you can tell me a little bit about Stan or others that really, you know, had maybe a little bit more forward vision than some of the other people that were involved in this, not only at USA, but the agencies and so forth?

J.S.: I perhaps picked Stan because he always - he has always appeared to me to be a more up-front sort of fellow. He says pretty much what he thinks, a pretty straightforward fellow. I always had the impression that maybe a lot of the concerns that the litigation raised or made public were perhaps concerns that he and others had anyway, and they weren't being addressed, or they weren't seeing them being addressed, and that he didn't find - some people viewed the litigation as a threat, and other people viewed it as an opportunity, I guess, and Stan always seemed to me to be a guy that looked at it as an opportunity, and even if there were problems exposed would recognize that they were problems that needed to be dealt with. In the case of the suit against USA that clearly exposed some management deficiencies and organization - they ended up being dealt with.

M.O'R.: And probably from his inside view he was already aware of at least some of those problems?

J.S.: Possibly so, or if he wasn't, recognized they clearly should have been. But at any rate, they were dealt with fairly promptly and thoroughly, and he was instrumental in doing that, and maybe as a result they learned more about an organization than they thought there was to learn.

It's just, you know, if things aren't challenged, things drift along and you accept a lot of things on faith rather than personal observation because nobody's telling you any different, or you've got other things to do. Maybe there were a lot of things going on by way of operation of treatment plants and so forth that people generally managing the organization weren't completely on top of. I simply don't know. I've never had a conversation with Stan - or really Gary, for that matter - where I got any sort of personal hostility, whereas other - there certainly are some others within USA, or have been, where that was not the case, where they clearly did feel threatened and -.

But I mean, this is the standard procedure for any government organization, maybe any organization, is that if anything threatens to change the way that they're used to doing business, they regard that as a threat, and their first reaction is not to automatically change the way they do business. Their first reaction is to try to do something harmful to the person that is threatening them.

M.O'R.: Right. Circle the wagons.

J.S.: Right. Right.

M.O'R.: Sort of a human ...

J.S.: We call it the cornered rat syndrome.

M.O'R.: Right. Well, in fact they may be just trying to put a good face on it in retrospect, but at least some of what I hear from people like Gary Krahmer, for instance, is that everybody now looks at it, you know, with hindsight and thinks that it was actually a pretty worthwhile thing to do, that maybe it has led to a better situation not only environmentally but even economically

than would have been the case otherwise, and I guess that was your argument from the very beginning.

J.S. ~~M.O'R.~~: Sure. Yeah, I think - we talked earlier about kind of pressures that an agency like USA gets, and I think they still get those. I think they're maybe - maybe they're the same, maybe they're different; I don't know. But they still have, you know, the homeowners - or the home builders not liking the thing - I mean, they have to do some things that they didn't used to have to do, and they don't like those. Well, if they don't like these things, there was something else before that they had to do that, you know, maybe they needed lot clearances that were larger than wanted - I mean, there's always something.

So the kinds of pressures may be somewhat different now, but I don't think they're any more. Maybe the quantity of pressure sort of stays constant and they're all imposing pressure so that there's no possible way that you can do something that isn't going to irritate somebody who will yell at you about it. And so nowadays they might be yelling about somewhat different things than they would have been yelling about, but they're still yelling. The point is that if - that I - what seemed to me, you know, many years ago fairly clear and what I have not seen any evidence to date that that was wrong is that people yelling today about requirements being put on them for how to do things, if somehow this process for managing water quality weren't there today, they wouldn't be doing things. I mean, it provides a - what has resulted is a system where you can take into account much more straightforwardly the environmental implications of development, and therefore development can go forward in a way that is not environmentally harmful.

Whereas before, if you simply let the harm develop, then you get to a point where things have to be stopped.

We could have been harvesting forests at sustainable rates over the past many, many decades in the Northwest and would therefore still be harvesting today at sustainable rates. The fact that for whatever greed or motivation you want to put on it they were harvested for about two decades at a catastrophic rate, and the only possible response that anybody ultimately that, you know, flies over the Northwest in an airplane can make is to say, "Well, we're going to have to curtail, seriously, seriously, the cutting of trees in the Northwest," for whatever reason, be it spotted owl or just, you know, you can't put more stress onto a system than the system can accept.

And this whole water quality management process in the Tualatin, what it's all about is about determining what the allowable stress is and then arranging things, managing, development and so forth, so that it operates within that tolerable stress level, be it - you know, we call it a loading capacity, you can call it assimilative capacity, carrying capacity, but by whatever term you want to call it, it's not automatic - I mean, economic development does not automatically create a particular environmental stress. I mean, the same economic activity can create a huge stress, or it can create a small stress. It's all about how you go about it.

In this case, there are things like retention ponds and some portion of open space or impervious areas associated with developments and so forth so that you - the same houses are being built, the same factories are being built, it's just that they're being constructed in a way that doesn't unnecessarily stress the Tualatin

River system. And the doing of it that way allows development to go ahead.

M.O'R.: It gets back to what you were talking about last time, about the short view versus the long view. I guess if you take the long view you see that it makes sense to take a little more effort when you do some development because otherwise it's going to wind up costing you more in the end.

J.S.: Well, maybe I'd say it a little better: I would say a view versus being consciously blind. You know, it's a matter of if you look and you - I mean, things work a certain way. There - sort of like it or not, there are kind of basic laws that the universe seems to conform to, and so you can for some time ignore them altogether, and eventually you - you can drive down the highway with your lights off and ignore the fact that someplace there's a brick wall, or you can turn your lights on and see where the brick wall is and do something about your driving patterns.

M.O'R.: It seems like the Tualatin story is somewhat of a success story, and particularly since most of the parties now seem to feel at least okay about, maybe not wildly enthusiastic, and certainly there have been some real dramatic reductions of the pollution in the Tualatin, maybe not quite as much as you'd like to see or as environmentalists would like to see, but still ...

J.S.: Well, it's not totally there, but it's certainly going in the right direction, and it's gone quite a long ways in the right direction. And there are still - you know, we're a ways from perfection in the way our various organizations operate, and we're probably not at the point of complete perfection in the way we lead our personal lives or anything else, but the basis for resource

management in the Tualatin River Basin has changed, and it has changed in my view clearly for the better, and I don't know anybody who has been harmed by that, and I can see plenty of people who have been bettered by that.

M.O'R.: You know, in listening to you tell the story of how all this took place, and also hearing you talk a little bit about some of the things you're now doing to help other groups around the country in various places do the same things, it gives me sort of an optimistic feeling, but I also see that, you know, it's partly based on your efforts, it's partly based on the basis of law that was laid out in the Clean Water Act that allowed you to bring the lawsuit and put the pressure on the system to bring these changes about. What do you see in the future? Do you think that we'll be able to continue to fight this battle and win it, or do you see any clouds on the horizon?

J.S.: We're doing this interview in the Thomas Jefferson room?

M.O'R.: That's right.

J.S.: Thomas Jefferson did and said a lot of constructive things, but the truest thing that he probably ever said was that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. So you may win battles and you may lose battles, but the war goes on probably forever. I mean, to say that you're going to finally win and things are suddenly going to be done in completely appropriate ways for all parties concerned seems like an inaccurate interpretation of human nature. I mean, if everybody knew all implications of everything that is done, there would still be selfish reasons for doing things that were harmful to others.

I mean, the whole idea of environmental management - the difficulty with environmental management has to do with who pays, who benefits and who pays, and the idea of internal versus external economies, and so long as somebody else downstream pays for the benefits you accrue upstream, you know, there's always going to be arguments, and the perfectly equitable answers are always going to be a matter of debate and so forth. And that's fine. I don't have any difficulty with debating things.

What my difficulty has always been is the failure to see that there is anything debatable, and so long as people making decisions, either personal or corporate or governmental, can see the implications of - I mean, see all of the implications or at least as much as there is to see of the implications of what they do, then you have the basis for a discussion, and you can decide that - I mean, maybe it is the universal wish that the Tualatin River - or it would have been the universal wish that the Tualatin River be an open sewer. My perception was that that was not the universal wish, or it was becoming an open sewer because people did not know any better, did not see the implications of what they do.

So if you have a process or system that kind of forces the implications to be accounted for, then that will allow you to do what you want to do in the way that you actually probably would like them to do if you had known how to do it that way or known that you needed to do it that way in the first place.

Now, that's the optimistic view. The pessimistic view, which may be the more realistic one certainly these days, is that people will - or at least there will be a significant fraction of the people who are primarily responsible for decision making who will

look and say, "Well, tough darts, I'm still going to get mine anyway, and let somebody else fix it later."

M.O'R.: In fact I guess a real question is - I mean, one of the things that gave NEDC and the folks that were concerned about the Tualatin the leverage over this issue was the Clean Water Act, and of course that's just a law passed by Congress ...

J.S.: Sure.

M.O'R.: ... and we've already seen moves with respect to the forest issue to put up some barriers to environmental groups going and suing in court.

J.S.: Sure.

M.O'R.: Would you anticipate seeing some of that activity with respect to the Clean Water Act as well?

J.S.: Sure. Sure. The expectation would be much less now than it was a year or so ago. I mean, that was clearly the intent of the majority of people who were elected to Congress in 1994. I mean, that was clearly the intent, and sort of in the guise of reducing - getting government off your back and reducing the burden of government regulation and so forth, which all sounded very good, that what was actually intended was to get rid of these pesky environmental constraints that stop us from being able to do whatever we feel like doing with our land or our property no matter who downstream it hurts or damages. Like I say, Jefferson, the price of liberty and all that.

It's just simply a lot more clear now what all of those words meant. They meant different things to different people, but they basically pretty clearly meant we're going to gut all of the environmental laws, and when it's put that way, then there is not

a popular upswelling for that objection; quite the contrary. And so I think that original intent is simply gone by now. We'll have to wait and see whether the people that had that intent will in a couple of years still be around anymore.

You know, there is a lot of political pressure very strongly from, unfortunately, the West about resource management and people on the land shouldn't be interfered with and so forth, and the pioneer spirit and all that ...

M.O'R.: Right. All these lawsuits that are being filed against the federal government that claim the BLM has no jurisdiction, et cetera.

J.S.: Yeah, that will also gradually go away, or most of it will go away. The sentiments will still exist in a lot of people - that's sort of why we have laws and why we have a system under which we're supposed to get along so that everybody doesn't do exactly everything they want to do at all times if those things are harmful to other people.

M.O'R.: Well, is there any other piece of this story that we haven't touched on that you think would be something worth talking about, or any other thoughts you have on this whole question?

J.S.: No. No. Like I say, things are not yet that close to perfection, and one still struggles and one still argues, but the direction that things are going, certainly in terms of water quality in the Tualatin, in spite of continual foot-dragging and kicking and screaming by people who shouldn't be doing that, the progress is still in the appropriate direction.

[end of side one]

JACK SMITH

TAPE 6, Side 2

February 2, 1996

M.O'R.: ... in terms of corporate interests or individual interests, fueled by greed or monetary kinds of motivations versus the larger kind of public good, or preserving a resource such as the Tualatin. But you touched on it just a moment ago, that to some extent it isn't really necessarily just the activities of these large forces in society, but the attitude that each of us carry around individually in terms of what we - how we live our lives, and maybe the stresses that you're talking about are really just the aggregate sum of the stress that each of us puts individually on the environment and the system. Do you have any thoughts along those lines, in terms of what kind of personal transformation might be required to further our objective of cleaning up the environment?

J.S.: Well, I guess the only thought I have is that one should stay a long way away from personal transformations or requirements for personal transformations, certainly, of others. I don't know that it's - I don't see it so much as the way one lives one's life. In point of fact, it is the large organizations, be they government or industry - government or corporate, who do the primary locating and relocating of resources or pollutants or whatever, and make the kinds of policy decisions.

I mean, it seems to me like we're way away from where the principal difficulties are some fetish about the way individual people either grow or buy their personal food or whether they wear

synthetic versus natural clothing or, you know, stuff like that. I think that the questions or the issues have to do with how comprehensive a system can be in which we make decisions, and the bureaucratic tendency is to make the system in which each individual bureaucrat makes decisions as narrow as possible to have as little freedom of action - or as little responsibility or blame or whatever - just to make the decision making individually as narrow as possible, and so that the cumulative or the effect of this whole system is not the responsibility of anyone, and it is therefore ignored, and therefore the sort of cumulative impact of all these - I mean, sometimes there is one great large, obviously visible, observable thing that is the source of a problem that you - you know, everything is very obvious what you do.

In the broader case, where the problem is kind of the cumulative result of a whole bunch of little, disconnected things, disconnected because they are systematically disconnected instead of systematically connected. That's - to keep reusing the word, that's a sort of systematic problem, and again, what - if it is much more generally understood, the wider and broader implications of what you do, then a lot of those implications will end up getting addressed, and they are the failing of systems, kind of regulatory systems or otherwise, is in the inability or the failure to address these kind of indirect implications.

M.O'R.: And the lack of appreciation by the population at large, probably, about how these things work?

J.S.: Well, I think the problem is more - well, I think we shouldn't start off mucking with the population at large all that much; the failure is in the people whose responsibility, who are

collecting a salary for knowing this sort of stuff, for recognizing it and - I mean, there are people whose job it presumably is - they have managed to redefine their jobs sufficiently narrowly so that they can escape that obligation, but we think that we're actually paying them to be responsible for knowing this stuff and doing something about it. It's a fact that they're not doing that, that they're taking our tax money under false pretenses, that has - where I think the focus should be more on changing the habits of the general populace because they're sort of naively thinking that their interests are being protected when they're not.

M.O'R.: Yeah, I was thinking more in terms of - rather than individual habits of how one lives one's life, more in terms of who's going to hold these bureaucrats and the bureaucracies accountable, and it seems like, you know, ultimately it will fall to us to do that.

J.S.: Sure. Well, it always has been our responsibility and obligation. It always will be. That will never change. And when we ignore that obligation - I mean, everything that happens actually is our fault, our collective fault, because we don't pay attention.

M.O'R.: Right. But it seems that somehow life these days is so complex that for the average person on the street, who doesn't, for instance, have your many years of training in environmental science, to appreciate that the head of DEQ or somebody isn't really doing, you know, the job that we perceive him or her to be doing. How does one, do you think, deal with this? Or is it just a matter of waiting until a problem becomes obvious enough so that you don't need expertise to figure it out?

J.S.: Yeah. Well, if I had answers to any of those kind of questions, I wouldn't be sitting here. I would already be king. That's a kind of universal - like I say, we all have our ideas about why, but at any rate, it's very complex and very widespread and very universal and very ingrained and sort of all about - kind of "I get mine, screw you" kind of a - some deeper philosophical thing than just environmental or just economic - it's a kind of basic premises of civilized society kind of concepts. Once we get around to actually looking those in the face and addressing them, then things will sort of magically all get fixed, and until we do that, we're all simply treating symptoms and building more prisons and more fences and more security systems and stuff.

M.O'R.: Well, I guess the one refreshing note in all of this is that the Tualatin story sort of proves that we're still in a situation where a relatively small number of concerned people can take a look at something and actually make a difference.

J.S.: That is the curious thing. That is the curious thing, all right. I mean, it is generally difficult to kind of change things, probably rightfully so, but oddly enough, there are circumstances where it actually is not so difficult, or it is certainly possible with not earth-shaking difficulty for a small group or even a single person to make - do things that will have far, far-reaching implications and changes. So it's sort of like there's a key to - and probably politics is a lot about that, there's some simple thing that Gordon Smith did or Ron Wyden did that happened to change the minds of three or four hundred people here or there. I mean, there's some kind of key that does it, you know, and maybe

there are people who can - and sometimes you can see what that is, and sometimes you simply can't.

I remember there was a book that I read - oh, God, it was a long, long time ago, and I've never forgotten it. It was really interesting. A guy named Pierre von Passant. I think it was called *That Day Alone*, and it was a collection of - it was written sometime around the Second World War or something, but it was just a collection of little vignettes, little stories of things that - interactions of people or things that were happening, and it was just a kind of casual decision, somebody would go walk down this street instead of that street or something, and it would be - the implications of that would be like the reason that the archduke got shot and World War I happened. Anyway, the book was about capturing, finding, and they were presumably true, those - or at least somebody's idea of what that precise moment, first that day and that precise moment that some trivial decision - these were not great, large decisions, some small thing caused the course of history to change that made the larger decisions inevitable. It was just really an interesting book conceptually, and the general thesis was sort of history as happening accidentally, that its course actually is determined by kind of unconscious things.

It's interesting that sometimes there are actually conscious things, that somebody could consciously do something and that seems to me to be hopeful, but what the thing is to change the dreary state that society has gotten itself somehow into really eludes me, but - I mean, I just hear like my son is a psychiatrist in Hawaii, and he's always - we talk on the phone a lot, and he works - let's see; you're not taping this, right?

M.O'R.: Well, I am, actually.

J.S.: Well, he teaches at the University of Hawaii, and he works for the state criminal hospital, or state hospital where they send the criminally insane people, as well as lots of other people, but kind of the way that it's managed and all the stifling crazy bureaucracy and systems and the way that - he says hospitals used to be run by doctors, and now they're not. They're somehow run by these mushy people and they have meetings, you know, where you talk about esteem building, and he said, "It's amazing. We have a whole bunch of meetings, this whole program about management of the place and relationships of people and stuff, and produce mission statements," and you know, the standard stuff that just goes on everywhere. But in his case, he says it's curious that out of this whole mission statement and goals and everything, he says, no place anywhere in any of the language or anything could he find the word "patient."

You know, somehow everything is taken over by - like I say, hospitals used to be run by doctors. I mean, the head of the hospital, even though he'd become an administrator, they were doctors. You know, they understood the point of the whole thing. Just like - oh, I don't know, there's a bunch of concern in the City of Portland about spending a million dollars to try to solve their combined sewer overflow problems, water quality problem, and it's only now sinking in that, gee, this is a lot of money, and that actually what they're proposing to do not only will not do any good, it will actually cause - appears as though it will cause some serious harm, environmental harm, as well as costing a fortune, and how does this happen. I mean, this is an organization that manages

and operates a very complex technical system of pipes and pumps and valves and treatment plants and so forth, and historically, you know, it used to be run by an engineer, and then somehow not too long ago, or you know, within the last decade or so, just now the engineers are nowhere - there's absolutely no technical understanding, engineering or scientific or anything, anywhere near any management decisions. I mean, they still have engineers, but they don't come to any of the meetings; I mean, everything is run by policy people. And just sort of everywhere it's like that. Like Microsoft will crash when Bill Gates retires and the company gets taken over by kind of mushy policy business school graduate types.

M.O'R.: Relates back to the Harvard Business School in the 70's again?

J.S.: Yeah, this whole idea that - it's like if you get a degree in education, that you learn about the techniques of teaching; the subject matter simply has no role in the concept of teaching, the education of teachers. I mean, obviously there are techniques for doing things; there are techniques for management and policy - but somehow - it seems to me, of course I'm biased because of my - well, I don't know if I am or not; I've done both. The policy part, the technique part, seems easily acquirable, and it really shouldn't be a kind of formal educational category or profession. Those are all kind of things you can pick up sort of on the job or along the way or whatever.

I don't think you can learn the fundamentals of science or technology along the way. I don't think those things you pick up casually from reading *Popular Mechanics*. I think there's kind of a fundamental - any more than you can become a doctor kind of in

your spare time. I mean, I think there's kind of an immersion into kind of the fundamental idea of thermodynamics and laws of the universe that's sort of an inviolable thing, that you don't typically pick that up along the way. I think you sort of have to -.

Anyway, that's a much harder thing to learn, but it's that that you have to know in order to understand kind of how things work. I mean, it's like when I talk to the City of Portland, for example, and when I talk to - not the engineering people, all of the seven layers up above the engineering people up to the City Council, you know, and I say, "Gee, you're spending probably about ten times more than you need to. I mean, you actually could improve water quality, you actually could meet water quality standards in the Willamette River for about 10 percent of what you're spending to make water quality worse."

And they say, "Well, how will we do that? I mean, is there some other city, some other example, someplace you could show us? Since, you know, we cannot understand - we can't figure anything out, you've got to give us something that we can copy."

And you know, I said, "Well, gee, you look at your particular system, and here are the kind of guidelines, and here are some - you know, water runs downhill and some - where there are holes, it will run out -." Anyway, but it is sort of a complicated system, and you require kind of computer models in order to predict things and figure stuff out, and there are a lot of things going on.

Well, it just - the reason they got in the place where they are is because they can't understand that. You know, there are obviously competing engineering views like there are competing legal views and competing medical views. Well, the reason that you

have a doctor running a hospital is because not every doctor is a robot that all think the same way. Each one will have different ideas about how to treat a patient or how to manage things, and you need somebody who can understand kind of where these arguments are coming from in order to be able to make decisions about conflicting views.

Well, engineering is the same way; you know, technical systems are the same way. It doesn't mean the doctor is going to be any good at making those decisions or figuring stuff out, or maybe he's just a really crappy doctor, or whatever. Nevertheless, it seems to me that if he's not a doctor, there's absolutely no hope, where if he is a doctor there's some hope that he might, and that's the same way with kind of complicated engineering or environmental systems. You know, if you have somebody who is completely ignorant of anything other than, you know, self esteem lectures and group motivational theory and stuff, there's zero hope, because they cannot distinguish sense from technical nonsense. So they just simply throw in their lot with somebody, and you know, maybe it will turn out that some creative or sensible engineer or technical type, and then they'll be lucky, but it won't have anything to do with them because they have no ability to distinguish whether what they're hearing makes sense or doesn't make sense, until it's over with, you know, and they've already spent the billion dollars, and they say, "Oh, this doesn't work."

M.O'R.: Of course this totally flies in the face of modern-day management theory, you know. They think that - you know, like you say, it used to be that doctors ran hospitals, and people I

guess would point to that as maybe you'd have somebody in there with no people skills, wouldn't be able to identify ...

J.S.: Sure, sure. I mean, you can have doctors who are terrible administrators, worse administrators than somebody else. The question is what is - you know, I think you can learn to be an administrator - or not all doctors, some doctors. The point is that simply being a doctor does not *a priori* automatically by definition disqualify you from becoming an administrator also. I think there is nothing that prevents an administrator from learning enough about doctoring to be able to do it, but he would have to stop being an administrator and go to medical school and put in the 15 years or whatever it takes before he got there. It's not something you learn along the way.

A couple of years ago one of Mike Lindberg's aides, we were talking about what to do about this billion dollar fiasco we're embarking on, still stream-rolling right ahead because nobody can figure out how to change anything. I said, "Seriously, shouldn't you have somebody in the decision-making process somewhere who's ever seen a sewer before?" just for example, and she just looked shocked that like any technical understanding automatically disqualifies you from - because that means you are the one with the blinders on, you're the one that can't see the big picture, and therefore you're immediately disqualified from participating in any of the decision-making process. I mean, "We policy makers, we decision makers, when we want to know something we'll ask you. Until then, you stay in your cubicle and do whatever you technical people do."

Anyway, that goes on everywhere. Everywhere: every school, every corporation, every agency, and it's that kind of screwy - you know, changing it won't automatically make anything different, but until it does there is no hope, because the whole world is run by people who don't have a clue. They know where the Prozac bottle is, and that's -.

M.O'R.: On that note, thank you very much, Jack, for the interview.

[end of tape]